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Abstract
At INDOCRYPT 2003 Abisha, Thomas, and Subramanian proposed two public key schemes based on word problems in free
partially commutative monoids and groups. We show that both proposals are vulnerable to chosen ciphertext attacks, and thus in
the present form must be considered as insecure.
c© 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The identification of mathematical problems that can serve as sound foundation for the construction of public key
schemes is a rather active area of research. It has turned out to be quite hard to come up with practical and secure
proposals that are not variants of proposals based on factoring large integers or computing discrete logarithms in
suitably represented finite cyclic groups. One line of research in this context focuses on the use of word problems
originating in group or language theory (see [5] for an introduction).
Unfortunately, some proposals in this direction turn out to be susceptible to annoyingly simple attacks that
circumvent the underlying (difficult) theoretical problem (cf. [2,3]). Until now, it remains an interesting challenge
to build practical cryptographic schemes originating in word problems.
At INDOCRYPT 2003 Abisha, Thomas, and Subramanian proposed two public key cryptosystems based on free
partially commutative monoids and groups [1]. In this contribution we show that in the present form these proposals
do not offer acceptable cryptographic security, as they succumb to quite efficient chosen ciphertext attacks. Recall that
chosen ciphertext attacks are those carried out with “restricted” access to the decryption device: that is, the adversary
gains knowledge about the target ciphertext (or the secret key) by selecting different ciphertexts for which he or she is
given the corresponding plaintexts. The strongest type of cryptanalysis consists of ciphertext only attacks, where the
adversary’s only source of information is ciphertext (and the public key). We will see that against one of the examples
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presented in [1], a very efficient ciphertext only attack can be mounted that enables an attacker to decrypt arbitrary
ciphertexts.
More recently, Levy-dit-Vehel and Perret [4] proposed another attack on the encryption schemes discussed below:
They focus on methods for solving the underlying (hard) problem efficiently for practical parameter choices. As
pointed out in [4], in terms of the public alphabet ∆ their attacks are exponential, but “fast enough to compromise
the use of practical sizes of∆”. Together with the efficient ciphertext attacks described in this contribution, this gives
ample evidence that the encryption schemes proposed by Abisha et al. in [1] do not offer acceptable cryptographic
security.
2. A proposal based on free partially commutative monoids
In this section we briefly recall the basic set-up of the first public key cryptosystem proposed by Abisha et al. at
INDOCRYPT 2003—for further details we refer the reader to the original paper [1]. We denote by Σ some (finite)
alphabet, and θ ⊆ Σ × Σ specifies a so-called concurrency relation, i.e., (a, b) ∈ θ means that each occurrence of
ab in a word u ∈ Σ∗ can be replaced by ba and vice versa. If v ∈ Σ∗ is derived from a word u ∈ Σ∗ by repeatedly
applying such replacements, we write u ≡θ v. In particular, ≡θ is a congruence relation, and it is pointed out in [1]
that the word problem in the free partially commutative monoid Σ∗/≡θ can be decided efficiently.
Let ∆ denote a finite alphabet whose cardinality is “sufficiently greater than that of Σ” ([1] provides no further
details here).
The secret data consists of Σ , θ along with two words x0, x1 ∈ Σ∗ such that x0 ≡θ x1. Further on, the secret key
contains a monoid homomorphism g : ∆∗ −→ Σ∗ which obeys the following conditions:
• For δ ∈ ∆ we either have g(δ) = λ (the empty word) or g(δ) ∈ Σ .
• At least for one letter δ ∈ ∆ we have g(δ) = λ.
The public data consists of two words y0 ∈ g−1(x0) and y1 ∈ g−1(x1). Further on, a Thue system T ⊆ ∆∗ × ∆∗
is specified such that for (u, v) ∈ T we either have (g(u), g(v)) ∈ {(ab, ba), (ba, ab)} with (a, b) ∈ θ or we have
g(u) = g(v). Thus, repeatedly applying rules in T to yi yields another element in g−1(xi ) (i ∈ {0, 1}). Here applying
a rule (u, v) ∈ T to a word w ∈ ∆∗ is to be understood as replacing an occurrence of u in w with v (or an occurrence
of v in w with u).
To encrypt a bit b ∈ {0, 1} we start with the corresponding public word yb and repeatedly apply rewrite rules specified
in T (no details of this process are specified in [1]). The resulting word c ∈ ∆∗ forms the ciphertext.
To decrypt a ciphertext c ∈ ∆∗ the word g(c) ∈ Σ∗ is computed. In the case of g(c)≡θ x0 the plaintext is 0; otherwise
it is 1. (Note that according to this specification a ciphertext is never considered as invalid.)
3. Security problems in the proposal based on free partially commutative monoids
In the proposed form, the above scheme does not address several issues that are crucial for the security of a practical
scheme. In particular, it is unclear how exactly the parameters are to be chosen and how the encryption process is to
be performed: For example, how do we decide which rule is to be applied next, and how many “rounds” of rewriting
are to be performed? Moreover, even when deciding the equivalence of words in ∆∗ with respect to T is hard, there
can be annoyingly trivial ways for an attacker to bypass this problem. As a (drastic) demonstration of the relevance of
this issue we can use the simple example from [1]:
Example 1. In the simple example put forward in [1], the public Thue system over the alphabet ∆ = {d1, . . . , d9}
reads
T = {(d1d3, d3d1), (d1d4, d4d1), (d2d3, d3d2), (d2d4, d4d2), (d5d3d1, d3d5),
(d5d4d2, d4d5), (d3d3d1, d3d3d1d5), (d6d7, d7d6), (d6d8, d8d6),
(d7d9, d9d7), (d8d9, d9d8)},
and the public words used for encrypting 0 and 1, respectively, are
y0 = d1d2d2d4d3d3d1d6d7d5d7d9d1d2d8d3d4d8d3d9
y1 = d1d2d2d4d6d3d4d6d7d5d1d5d8d4d3d8d9.
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This Thue system T is designed to have an undecidable word problem. Nevertheless an attacker can easily decrypt
arbitrary plaintexts encrypted under such a public key: All rewrite rules in T leave the number of occurrences of the
letter d9 invariant. Consequently, each encryption of 0 contains the same number of d9’s as y0 does (namely 2), whereas
each encryption of 1 results in a ciphertext with a single d9. In exactly the same way, unauthorized decryption of a bit
can be carried out by counting the number of d3’s, d4’s, d6’s, or d7’s in the ciphertext, as the number of occurrences
of these letters in y0 and y1 is different and is not altered by the rewriting rules.
Unfortunately, even when the system parameters are chosen in such a way that ciphertext only attacks can be
excluded, the following chosen ciphertext attack can still apply:
1. For each δ ∈ ∆ (more precisely, for each letter δ occurring in the public data), the attacker sends the concatenation
y0δ to the owner of the secret key. If the resulting ciphertext does not decrypt to 0, we know that g(δ) = λ. On the
other hand, if the resulting plaintext is 0, we may assume g(δ) = λ. To increase the plausibility of this assumption,
one may send further ciphertexts formed by inserting δ at several randomly chosen positions in y0.
In [1] no detailed specification for the key generation is given, but for a realistic public key size we must assume
that an attacker can determine the set {δ ∈ ∆ : g(δ) = λ}. Through removal of these “superfluous” letters the
attacker can find a “reduced” scheme with parameters ∆′, T ′, y ′0, y
′
1, potentially easier to handle. Specifically, for
the example in [1] (with the public key given in Example 1) this first step of our attack is already devastating and
actually yields the secret key:
Example 2. On input y0di a legitimate recipient finds the plaintext 0 for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9} and 1 for i ∈ {6, 7, 8}.
So with the attack just described the adversary is left with∆′ = {d6, d7, d8}, T ′ = {(d6d7, d7d6), (d6d8, d8d6)} and
the public words y ′0 = d6d7d7d8d8, y ′1 = d6d6d7d8d8; that is, by performing this simple analysis, the secret key as
specified in [1] is actually revealed.
Although [1] does not detail how to generate such keys, let us consider the case where the procedure just described
fails to reveal the complete secret key. Then we can continue as follows to identify letters with identical image
under g.
2. Let η0 be the first letter of y ′0, and replace some occurrence(s) of η0 in y ′0 by a letter ξ0 ∈ ∆′ \ {η0}. If the word
obtained no longer decrypts to 0, we know that g(η0) = g(ξ0); on the other hand if the ciphertext obtained by such
a replacement still decrypts to 0, it is plausible to assume g(η0) = g(ξ0). Once we have completed these tests for
the first letter of y ′0, we can proceed in the same manner with another letter of y ′0, therewith trying to find out which
letters in y ′0 have identical images under g.
Next, we apply the same technique to some encryption of y ′0 under T ′ in order to get information about letters
not contained in y ′0. Note that—provided the decryption procedure does not detect invalid ciphertexts (which in the
original specification from [1] is the case)—we are limited to those rules in T ′ that can be applied when encrypting
y0: As invalid ciphertexts always decrypt to 1, modifying encryptions of 1 is not that helpful. All the same, we have
to assume that the described approach allows an adversary to reveal significant information on “redundant” letters
in ∆ by means of O(∆′2) (fake) chosen ciphertexts.
3. After the previous step we can select a subset ∆′′ ⊆ ∆′ which contains exactly one letter of many (possibly all)
preimages g−1(σ ), σ ∈ Σ . Let T ′′, y ′′0 , y ′′1 be the variants of T ′, y ′0, y ′1 obtained by replacing each letter with its
representative in ∆′′. In order to learn which letters in g(∆′′) commute, we proceed analogously to in the previous
step: By applying rewrite rules in T ′′ to y ′′0 , we try for each pair (δ, π) ∈ ∆′′ ×∆′′ (δ = π) to find encryptions of
0 which contain the letter sequence δπ or πδ. Then we replace δπ with πδ (resp. πδ with δπ), and check whether
this “partially commuted” ciphertext still decrypts to 0.
Thus, with O(∆′′2) (fake) ciphertexts we can get a plausible candidate for the set {(δ, π) ∈ ∆′′ × ∆′′ :
g(δ)g(π) = g(π)g(δ)}.
After having successfully completed these steps (requiring O(∆2) chosen ciphertexts), an attacker is in a situation
comparable to the legitimate owner of the secret key: Given a ciphertext, letters δ ∈ ∆ with g(δ) = λ can be removed,
and different representatives of the same σ ∈ Σ can be replaced with a unique representative in ∆′′. Further on,
due to Step 3 above, we know (or at least have a plausible guess for) which pairs (g(δ), g(π)) belong to the secret
concurrency relation θ , so recognizing ciphertexts c with g(c)≡θ g(y0) can be considered as feasible. As our attack
above always began with an encryption of 0, it may well happen that sometimes we fail in checking the condition
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g(c)≡θ g(y1)—e.g., such a ciphertext c could involve a letter δ ∈ ∆ which did not occur in any encryption of 0 that
we used for our attack. But this is not really a concern: We have good chances to correctly identify all ciphertexts c
with g(c)≡θ g(y0) and all ciphertexts not satisfying this condition decrypt to 1 anyway. Thus, in summary an attacker
has good chances of successfully decrypting a non-negligible part (possibly all) ciphertexts encrypted under the public
key. As we have pointed out, in particular for the concrete example given in [1], Step 1 already allows the attacker to
decrypt as a legitimate receiver. Unfortunately, in [1] no further examples or detailed key generation procedures are
specified that could extend the testing ground for our attack. However, we think the above discussion already gives
ample evidence of the significance of our attack.
4. Security problems in the proposal based on free partially commutative groups
The authors of [1] put forward another public key scheme which is essentially a particular case of the one already
discussed, where the free partially commutative monoid is actually a group. Adapting the above attack to this proposal
is straightforward, and we omit a detailed description of the scheme. One issue which is different from the above
setting, and which simplifies the attack, is the following: The second proposal of Abisha et al. makes use of the word
problem in finitely presented groups. A consequence of this is the fact that for each letter δ ∈ ∆ a “formal inverse”
δ−1(∈ ∆−1) is available whose image under g is determined by g(δ) already.
By making use of these formal inverses we can easily form (fake) ciphertexts that help to check for arbitrary
u, v ∈ (∆±1)∗ whether g(u) and g(v) represent equivalent words in the secret finitely presented group. For doing so
we start with a word u0 encrypting 0 and insert uv−1 at random positions in u0. By construction of the scheme, g
maps all ciphertexts encrypting 0 to the empty word, and if after insertion of uv−1 we still obtain a decryption of 0,
it is plausible to assume that g(uv−1) maps to λ, too. In other words we may assume that g(u) and g(v) represent
equivalent words in the secret group. Similarly as in the first scheme, the secret finitely presented group is determined
by commutativity relations, and by making use of the formal inverses as just sketched, one can check comparatively
easily which generators of the secret group (probably) commute.
Again, [1] lacks a detailed specification of the key generation, but for the specific example provided by Abisha
et al. our attack is extraordinary effective:
Example 3. In [1, Example 1] a secret finite presentation 〈{a, b, c}|{ac = ca}〉 of a group G is selected, together with
two words x0 = λ, x1 = ab−1a. Then, a finite presentation of a group G¯ with generator set ∆ = {c1, . . . , c6} and
a set of relations “coherent” with the presentation of G is published, and a secret morphism g : ∆ −→ {a, b, c}
with g(c1) = g(c2)−1 = a; g(c4) = b−1; g(c6) = c; g(c3) = g(c5) = λ is fixed. Also, two words
u0 = c−11 c−16 c−14 c3c−15 c4c−12 c6, u1 = c−12 c4c1 in (∆ ∪∆−1)∗ are made public, which are mapped by g to x0 and x1
respectively.
Suppose the attacker asks for decryptions of u0ci c−1j and u0ci c j for i, j = 1, . . . , 6. Doing this, he or she learns
that g(c3) = g(c5) and g(c1) = g(c2)−1. Thus, he or she knows the group G can be presented by three elements
g(c2), g(c3) and g(c4). Now, checking whether u0ci c j c−1i c
−1
j decrypts to 0 for i = j ∈ {2, 3, 4} he or she also finds
which generators commute, and thus retrieves a presentation of G. (Using ciphertexts of the form u0ci , the superfluous
generator c3 could also be identified as such.)
5. Conclusion
The above discussion illustrates that in the present form both public key encryption schemes proposed in [1] do not
offer acceptable cryptographic security. The authors leave open crucial details of the key generation and the encryption
procedure; in particular, as we point out, it is not clear how to dodge simple ciphertext only attacks by a clever key
generation procedure.
However, even assuming a robust key generation procedure impeding simple ciphertext only attacks, we have
illustrated how a chosen ciphertext attack can enable an attacker to decrypt a non-negligible part (possibly all) of the
ciphertexts. Our attack strategy has been proven extraordinary efficient for all examples provided by Abisha et al.
in [1].
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